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Victim Compensation Funds and Tort 






How do victim compensation funds (VCFs) impact a 
victim’s likelihood to sue using the tort system? This issue is 
of more than theoretical interest, as VCFs have become a 
seemingly ubiquitous feature of the policy landscape 
following high-profile tragedies. For example, following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress created a 
special compensation fund for victims who waived their right 
to sue.1 After being swarmed with thousands of donations in 
the wake of the Virginia Tech massacre, Virginia Tech 
established the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund to provide 
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 1. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230, 239-40 (2001). 
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monetary compensation to victims.2 Victims of the Aurora, 
Colorado movie theater shooting received payments from a 
VCF,3 as did victims in the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shooting4 and the Boston Marathon bombing.5 BP paid out 
more than $6.2 billion to over 220,000 claims through its Gulf 
Coast Claims Facility, a private compensation fund it 
established in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.6 
Even prior to 9/11, funds were established for victims of the 
Columbine High School shooting and the Oklahoma City 
bombing. 
VCFs exist in parallel to—or in some cases, as with the 
9/11 Fund, as a substitute for—the tort system, which 
remains the apex source of compensation for victims of 
personal injury. While a small body of empirical scholarly 
research on VCFs has emerged in recent years, much of the 
foundational work regarding how such funds affect behavior 
of victims, their legal representatives, and current and 
potential tortfeasors remains undone. 
One particular gap in scholarly understanding of VCFs 
concerns how such funds affect victims’ attitudes towards, 
and their willingness to engage in, tort litigation. Because 
existing empirical research on VCFs has been primarily 
retrospective—focusing on the amount of compensation 
provided by funds and whether participants were satisfied 
with their experience—we know little about how the 
particular characteristics of a VCF contribute to its ultimate 
success or failure. For example, does the mere existence of a 
fund alter people’s calculations about whether to pursue 
litigation, how much to seek in compensation, and from 
  
 2. We Remember, VA. TECH., http://www.vt.edu/fund (last visited Oct. 19, 
2015). 
 3. Kayla Arneson, Feinberg Finalizes Payments from Aurora Victim Relief 
Fund, COMMUNITY FIRST (Nov. 16, 2012), http://communityfirstfoundation.org/
news/news-releases/feinberg-finalizes-payments-from-aurora-victim-relief-fund.  
 4. Who We Are, NEWTOWN-SANDY HOOK COMMUNITY FOUND., INC., 
http://www.nshcf.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
 5. About the One Fund, ONE FUND BOS., https://secure.onefundboston.org/
pages/about (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
 6. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/697201241917226179477.pdf. 
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whom, or is a fund only as good as the amount of 
compensation it provides? Are there particular contexts 
where funds are more likely to shift attitudes towards tort 
litigation? Answers to these questions might help 
policymakers decide whether to establish a VCF following a 
particular event as well as guide fund structure and design. 
Nonetheless, empirical data illuminating these questions 
remains elusive. 
In this Article, we provide novel evidence on the 
relationship between VCFs and tort litigation, drawing from 
a nationally representative survey of 1558 adult respondents. 
Our survey presents a hypothetical scenario where a mass 
shooting at a concert injures a friend or family member of the 
respondent. We experimentally vary whether a VCF exists 
following the shooting, the amount of loss, and the amount of 
compensation provided, allowing us to examine how these 
attributes of a situation affect decisions regarding whether to 
pursue litigation, and whom to sue. We also collected a 
substantial amount of qualitative information from our 
survey respondents, which permits us to better gauge the 
reasons why some respondents choose not to sue, and more 
clearly understand how VCFs shape attitudes towards tort 
recovery.  
A key virtue of our survey approach is that it allows us 
to draw inferences about how changing characteristics of a 
VCF would alter behavior holding other factors constant. 
Obtaining such conclusions would be close to impossible with 
real-world data, since it would essentially require several 
factually identical mass shootings with different types of 
VCFs. To buttress our experimental findings, and to assess 
whether our experimental findings are likely to translate to 
the real world, we also carefully examined published 
accounts of victim behavior following a number of recent 
mass tragedies involving actual VCFs.  
Our experimental survey reveals that VCFs can play an 
important role in shaping decisions to pursue litigation in the 
wake of a tragedy. In particular, we demonstrate that in our 
mass injury scenario: (1) litigation is less likely when a VCF 
provides compensation to victims, even when such 
compensation does not require waiving one’s right to sue; (2) 
the amount of compensation provided by the VCF matters; 
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(3) adequacy of compensation is measured relative to 
economic loss, rather than in absolute terms; (4) a 
substantial fraction of the population would pursue a suit 
even when fully compensated for economic loss; and (5) VCFs 
affect decisions regarding whether to sue, but not whom to 
sue. We also show that a modest but non-negligible subset of 
the population express an unwillingness to pursue a suit 
even following a significant uncompensated loss, and that 
several demographic characteristics predict willingness to 
pursue a suit. 
Our qualitative analysis reveals factors beyond 
compensation that can affect victims’ willingness to pursue 
litigation. Many who receive partial compensation from the 
VCF cite the costs and hassles of litigation as a deterrent to 
further pursuing a suit. Others who receive compensation, 
but still want to sue, express concern about latent injuries or 
potential future unforeseen costs, or focus on ensuring that 
responsible parties are held accountable and adequately 
punished. These findings are consistent with prior 
theoretical work on tort that focuses on the variety of 
functions played by the tort system beyond simple provision 
of compensation. Ultimately, our findings suggest that VCFs 
are an imperfect substitute for litigation given that people 
see tort law as more than just a means to compensation. 
There are, however, certain circumstances where VCFs may 
be effective at reducing some litigation 
Part I provides an overview of the existing research on 
VCFs, and briefly outlines some of the theoretical work on 
the tort system relevant for our Study. Part II discusses our 
survey platform, the American Life Panel, and considers the 
strengths and limitations of survey data in this context. 
Part III presents our results. We first provide a quantitative 
analysis of our survey responses, including an analysis of 
how VCF characteristics and respondent demographics 
influence decisions regarding whether and whom to sue. We 
next turn to the qualitative data to help us better explain 
respondents’ decisions. Finally, we compare what we learned 
from the survey with actual observed behavior of victims 
receiving payments from VCFs. Finally, the Article concludes 
by discussing the policy implications of our findings. 
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I. EXISTING RESEARCH ON VCFS AS AN  
ALTERNATIVE TO TORT LITIGATION 
Although there has been considerable theoretical and 
empirical work examining administrative alternatives to tort 
such as workers’ compensation,7 vaccine compensation 
funds,8 and no-fault auto insurance,9 there has been less 
scholarly work examining the attributes and impacts of 
compensation funds established in the wake of one-time mass 
injury events such as terrorist events or shootings. Much of 
the recent scholarly work on VCFs has centered on the first 
9/11 VCF, with a handful of studies providing some data on 
the interplay between the 9/11 Fund and the tort system.10 In 
  
 7. See, e.g., Richard J. Butler, Lost Injury Days: Moral Hazard Differences 
Between Tort and Workers’ Compensation, 63 J. RISK & INS. 405 (1996); D. Han 
Chang, Workers’ Compensation for Occupational Disease: Prorating Liability 
Versus Last Employer Liability, 60 J. RISK & INS. 647 (1993); Jean C. Love, Actions 
for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault 
Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers’ Compensation), 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
857 (1985); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Workers’ Compensation: Wage 
Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 249 (1987).  
 8. See, e.g., Gemma Flamberg, An Experiment in Tort Reform: The National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 635, 
635 (1995).  
 9. See, e.g., JAMES ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH 
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE (2010); DAVID LOUGHRAN, 
RAND CORP., THE EFFECTS OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE ON DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND 
AUTO ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001); Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault 
and First Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611 
(2000). 
 10. In addition to the empirical studies discussed here, there have been a 
number of theoretical studies of the 9/11 Fund and other VCFs. See, e.g., Robert 
M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective 
Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135 
(2005); Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: 
Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. 
L. REV. 51 (2003); John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of 
Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027 (2003); Erin G. Holt, The September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
513 (2003); Stephan Landsman, A Chance to Be Heard: Thoughts About 
Schedules, Caps, and Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL LAW REV. 393 (2003); Linda S. Mullenix, 
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assessing how victims view compensation, Deborah R. 
Hensler compared and contrasted comments made by 9/11 
victims and members of the public in response to proposed 
and finalized rules of the 9/11 VCF.11 She found that both 
members of the public and 9/11 victims preferred a tort-like 
compensation system based on economic loss, and not based 
on victims’ needs or notions of equality.12 However, the 
comments suggested victims compared their compensation to 
others, and that those who received the most felt the result 
was just, while those who received less felt morally slighted.13  
Brian H. Borstein and Susan Posers’ first study on the 
9/11 VCF supports Hensler’s results. Using a survey of 9/11 
victims, Borstein and Poser used the novelty of the 9/11 VCF 
to test theories of distributive justice.14 They found that the 
more compensation victims received, the more they felt 
compensation was fair, and that it was fair compared to what 
others received.15 Overall, however, dissatisfaction among 
9/11 VCF claimants was substantial.16 
Two other studies share some similarities to our own, as 
they pertain to how 9/11 victims evaluated the tradeoff 
  
Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving 
Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819 (2011); Linda S. Mullenix, 
The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim 
Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315 (2004); George L. Priest, The 
Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 527 (2003); Robert I. Rabin, The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003); Mike Steenson & Joseph Michael Sayler, The Legacy 
of the 9/11 Fund and the Minnesota I-35W Bridge-Collapse Fund: Creating a 
Template for Compensating Victims of Future Mass-Tort Catastrophes, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 524 (2008). 
 11. Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice through 
Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 432-51 
(2003). 
 12. See id. at 453-55. 
 13. See id.  
 14. Brian H. Borstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and 
Distributive Justice in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 76-77 (2007). 
 15. Id. at 93. 
 16. Id. at 90-91. 
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between compensation through a VCF and litigation. After 
surveying and interviewing 9/11 victims, Gillian K. Hadfield 
found the choice confronting 9/11 victims was not as easy as 
weighing the probability of winning a judgment in court 
against guaranteed, comparatively rapidly paid money from 
the VCF.17 Many felt more were responsible than just the 
terrorists, blaming the airline security firms, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, intelligence agencies, and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.18 Among 
respondents who chose the fund, many did so reluctantly. 
Twenty-five percent of respondents were unsure if they had 
made the right choice and 10% regretted their decision.19 
More than half the respondents who chose the fund found the 
decision to be difficult, often feeling as though they missed 
an opportunity to seek accountability.20 Ultimately, Hadfield 
suggests that such funds may not necessarily be an adequate 
substitute for litigation.21  
Bornstein and Poser offer several additional findings 
that more or less corroborate Hadfield’s study. Using another 
survey of 9/11 victims, they found some lingering doubts 
amongst victims about whether taking compensation over 
litigation was the right course.22 Twenty-nine percent of 
respondents who chose the fund were unsure if they had 
made the right choice and 7% felt they made the wrong 
decision.23 Even among those who felt they made the right 
choice by going with the fund, more than half felt they 
  
 17. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the 
Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV., 645, 645 (2008).  
 18. Id. at 656-58.  
 19. Id. at 663. 
 20. See id. at 663-64.  
 21. See id. at 673-76. 
 22. Brian H. Bornstein & Susan Poser, Victims, Lawyers, and Money: Legal 
Representation in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 15 (Mar. 2010) 
(unpublished paper), http://works.bepress.com/brian_bornstein/1. 
 23. Id. at 20. 
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received less compensation than they would have if they had 
successfully sued.24  
Although this research on the 9/11 Fund provides some 
indications as to how VCFs might affect attitudes towards 
litigation—for example, highlighting the significant role that 
the amount of compensation and the desire for accountability 
played in victims’ decision-making process—it is unclear 
whether the findings from the 9/11 Fund are likely to 
generalize to other types of funds. The legislation creating 
the 9/11 Fund gave victims a choice: litigation or VCF 
compensation.25 Those who chose the VCF were eligible for 
up to $8.5 million in compensation,26 but they waived their 
right to sue.27 Those who chose litigation could only bring 
their claim to the federal court of the Southern District of 
New York, and damages were capped by the amount of 
insurance carried at the time of the attacks by the defendant 
airline.28 The 9/11 VCF thus differs from many of the other 
VCFs that have arisen in the wake of mass injuries in that 
(1) victims were required to waive the right to sue, (2) those 
who did sue faced a tort process constrained by sui generis 
federal statute, and (3) there was a substantial pool of 
compensation money available relative to the number of 
victims. In all, less than a hundred victims litigated the 
matter29 and the VCF paid over $7 billion to 5562 people, 
which included families of the deceased and those who 
suffered physical injury.30 
The present Study contrasts with this prior work in that 
we employ an experimental survey-based research design 
that allows us to measure how variations in the 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001). 
 26. KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE 
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 109 (2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/final_report.pdf.  
 27. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 240. 
 28. Id. §408(a), (b)(3).  
 29. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 646.  
 30. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT 
TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at xi (2005).  
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characteristics of a VCF influence expected behavior, 
something that is not possible in the study of real-world 
funds since fund characteristics are fixed. For real-world 
funds, one cannot readily construct a counterfactual for how 
individuals would have behaved had a fund not existed or 
had different characteristics. In addition, our hypothetical 
uses a VCF that exists alongside traditional tort litigation. 
Unlike the 9/11 Fund, most of the VCFs that have been 
established following mass shootings or tragedies 
supplemented, rather than substituted for, tort litigation. 
These prior studies on VCFs are embedded within a 
larger theoretical literature examining the tort system that 
is also relevant for the present Study. Although legal scholars 
have advanced numerous competing approaches to 
understanding the aims of tort law, two approaches currently 
stand at the forefront of debate.31 The first portrays the 
purpose of tort law as primarily a means to deter 
economically wasteful activity.32 Damages are imposed to 
incentivize potential wrongdoers to, in the future, “weigh the 
costs of injury against the benefits of productive activity.”33 
The second “corrective justice” perspective posits that tort 
law’s aim is to “enforce[ ] duties of repair that arise in 
response to wrongdoing.”34 Thus, where one party harms the 
interests of another, the injurer must compensate the injured 
in order to restore her to her pre-injury position.35  
  
 31. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of 
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 193 (2000); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories 
of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1801, 1801 (1997). 
 32. Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort 
Law, 88 IND. L.J. 469, 469 (2013); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1828.  
 33. Hensler, supra note 11, at 421. 
 34. Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 107, 108 (2011); see also Culhane, supra note 10, at 1069.  
 35. Culhane, supra note 10, at 1033. For additional examples of the framing of 
tort law goals, consider George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 
VAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987) (“The goals of modern law are reduction of the accident 
rate and the provision of compensation to the injured. . . . [T]hese goals should 
command widespread acceptance.”); Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the “Crisis”: 
A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 765 
(1987) (“Tort law’s primary function, this essay proposes, is not to compensate, 
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While these theoretical perspectives shed some light on 
the potential role of VCFs within the larger tort system, more 
directly relevant for this Study is the following question: 
What is the purpose of tort law from the viewpoint of actual 
and potential consumers of the system? While the literature 
on plaintiffs’ perception of tort goals is modest compared to 
the volumes of legal scholarship on theories of tort, some 
research and discussion on this topic exists.  
In studies where plaintiffs are interviewed or surveyed 
about their litigation objectives, they share narratives that 
reflect their desire to pursue litigation on the basis of 
strongly-held principles that are separate from, or exclusive 
of, any desire for a financial recovery.36 For example, in a 
study that evaluated plaintiffs’ motivation behind litigation 
in medical malpractice cases, Tamara Relis indicated that 
“‘It’s not about the money!’ was a common theme throughout 
virtually all plaintiffs’ discourse. The issue of ‘principle’ was 
prominent for plaintiffs as revealed in the various objectives 
they passionately spoke about.”37 Apart from compensation, 
plaintiffs may express a desire for acknowledgement of their 
loss;38 wrongdoers to be held accountable for harm they have 
  
deter, or punish, but rather to resolve disputes arising from perceived breaches of 
important social norms, thereby reducing conflict and reaffirming those norms.”). 
 36. Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About The Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of 
Plaintiff’s Litigation Aims, 68 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 342, 361 (2006).  
 37. Id. Even where money is an explicit objective of a plaintiff, money might 
be viewed as a secondary rather than primary goal. See id. at 363. Compensation 
can also symbolize “a means towards . . . nonmonetary ends,” Hensler, supra note 
11, at 429, such ends being, for example, a signal that the plaintiff was “heard 
and acknowledged or as a deterrent to future conduct.” Relis, supra note 36, at 
378.  
 38. Relis, supra note 36, at 364 (describing a study where medical malpractice 
plaintiffs’ objectives included obtaining physician acknowledgement of harm); see 
also Liesbeth Hulst & Arno J. Akkermans, Can Money Symbolize 
Acknowledgement? How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their 
Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245, 252, 258 (2011). 
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caused;39 an apology or admission of guilt from wrongdoers;40 
information and answers;41 policy changes that would 
prevent re-occurrences of the harm;42 and retribution or 
  
 39. Tom Tyler discusses a powerful example of plaintiffs’ desire for 
accountability: 
In 1990, Tom Durkin conducted a study that included in-depth 
interviews with asbestos victims who already were involved in the civil 
justice system[ ]. . . . Durkin found that . . . victims repeatedly expressed 
a preference for adjudication. This preference was distinct from a desire 
for compensation, however. It stemmed from a desire to face the asbestos 
companies in court where the litigants could present evidence about their 
harm and the court could make official findings of wrongdoing. 
Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, 
53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 199, 202-03 (1990) (citing Tom Durkin, The Settlement 
of Asbestos Claims in the United States and United Kingdom (1990) (working 
paper) (Am. Bar Found.); see also Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661 (quoting one 
9/11 plaintiff who framed the decision to pursue litigation as a “duty to pursue 
those responsible for [her] loss in court.”); Hensler, supra note 11, at 427-28; Sally 
Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the 
Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153 (1984) (arguing that by the time 
parties turn from interpersonal discussion and negotiation to third party or court 
intervention, “the grievant wants vindication . . . , an advocate to help in the 
battle, or a third party who will uncover the ‘truth’ and declare the other party 
wrong.”); Relis, supra note 36, at 364. 
 40. Relis, supra note 36, at 363-64, 379. For example, one plaintiff whose 
mother was injured in a fall at a hospital described the decision to sue: “The whole 
reason for all of this is, as we said to our lawyer was ‘[m]y mother needed an 
apology.’ ‘That’ is what this is about: the mistakes and no apology, nothing.” Id. 
at 378; see also Hulst & Akkermans, supra note 38, at 252, 258. 
 41. In Relis’ 2006–2007 study, “‘obtaining answers or explanations’ about what 
happened was the second most repeated litigation objective of plaintiffs” in her 
dataset of claimants who filed medical malpractice suits. Relis, supra note 36, at 
365. Similarly, in deciding whether or not to accept payment from the September 
11th Victim Compensation Fund or file a lawsuit, respondents in Hadfield’s study 
who decided to sue identified as a consideration their desire for information 
obtainable through the litigation process. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661-62; see 
also Hensler, supra note 11, at 417 (depicting victims’ “need to understand why 
this happened” as a familiar refrain); Merry & Silby, supra note 39, at 153 
(describing grievant’s desire to “uncover the ‘truth’”); Tamara Relis, Civil 
Litigation from Litigants’ Perspectives: What We Know and What We Don’t Know 
About the Litigation Experience of Individual Litigants, 25 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 
151, 155 (2002).  
 42. In fact, preventing the wrong from happening again ranked at the top 
(along with admission of fault) among the respondents in Relis’ 2006–2007 study 
examining medical malpractice plaintiffs’ litigation objectives. Relis, supra note 
36, at 363 fig.4. Similarly, in Hadfield’s study, respondents who faced the decision 
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punishment.43 These varied goals reflect the fact that 
“litigants are propelled into litigation as a result of not only 
material but also psychological and emotional needs to 
alleviate the effects of distressing experiences. Hence, their 
aims often include non-monetary elements.”44  
A VCF’s impact on a victim’s willingness to sue might 
depend, at least in part, on the VCF’s ability to meet the non-
monetary goals of plaintiffs. Therefore, our research, along 
with other studies on VCFs, should be understood within the 
context of the broader literature addressing the purpose of 
tort law and plaintiffs’ perception of tort law’s aims. Such 
scholarship is instructive as we analyze the responses 
received through our survey.  
II. DATA 
To better measure how VCF payments affect attitudes 
towards litigation, we fielded an original experimental 
survey of a nationally representative group of U.S. adults. 
The survey was conducted in August 2013 using the 
American Life Panel (ALP), an Internet-based survey 
platform developed by the RAND Corporation. ALP 
participants include about 6000 individuals over the age of 
eighteen who are compensated for regularly participating in 
web-based research surveys.45 RAND recruits ALP 
participants in a variety of ways, most notably from among 
participants in other prominent national surveys involving 
  
between payout from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund or pursuit 
of litigation believed that suing could give them the chance to promote change 
through the courts. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 649, 662.  
 43. Relis, supra note 36, at 363 fig.4. “Only rarely do these accounts show us 
vengeful plaintiffs. But occasionally plaintiffs . . . describ[e] their desire to hurt 
defendants, as they have been hurt.” Hensler, supra note 11, at 429 (footnote 
omitted). Parties also may seek to “use litigation as a coercive weapon.” Relis, 
supra note 41, at 156.  
 44. Relis, supra note 41, at 193; see also Relis, supra note 36, at 341, 360-61, 
382-83. 
 45. RAND CORP., RAND AM. LIFE PANEL 1 (2015), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP500/CP508-2015-05/RAND_CP508-
2015-05.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
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random selection.46 To further minimize selection bias, 
laptops and internet access are provided to those who lack 
such capabilities.47 Since panel members are paid, response 
rates are usually high.48 For this Study, the survey was 
completed by 1558 randomly selected participants from the 
ALP.  
Our experimental survey incorporates two particular 
features that allow us to better assess how the existence and 
characteristics of VCFs affect attitudes towards pursuing 
litigation following a mass-injury event. First, we randomly 
assign respondents to different versions of the survey, 
altering across survey versions the amount of loss 
experienced during the injury, whether a VCF exists to 
provide injury compensation, and the amount of 
compensation provided by the VCF. A key virtue of 
randomization in this context is that it allows us to attribute 
differences in expressed attitudes towards litigation to 
variation in the particular situations presented across 
variants of the survey, rather than other factors. For 
example, it seems reasonable to expect that answers 
regarding whether to pursue litigation are influenced by 
unobservable individual characteristics such as attitudes 
towards the legal profession, prior experience with litigation, 
or assumptions regarding information not explicitly provided 
in the text of the question. However, randomization provides 
confidence that these unobserved factors are unlikely to 
differ systematically across respondents to the different 
versions of the survey. Second, we allow participants to 
provide free-form explanations for their answers regarding 
whether and whom to sue. These responses provide a wealth 
of qualitative information about attitudes towards litigation 
and how these attitudes change based upon the available 
forms of compensation. 
  
 46. See id.; Recruitment, RAND AM. LIFE PANEL, https://alpdata.rand.org/
index.php?page=panelcomposition (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). ALP members 
were recruited from the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center’s 
Monthly Survey and the “Abt” SRBI’s National Survey Panel. Id.  
 47. RAND AM. LIFE PANEL, supra note 45, at 1. 
 48. See id.  
1276 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Although the survey approach helps us better isolate the 
effects of particular features of a situation on decision 
making, experimental surveys are not without drawbacks. 
One key limitation of the present survey is that survey 
responses may exhibit hypothetical bias, or a tendency for 
choices on the survey to deviate from the actual choices 
respondents would make when faced with real-life decisions 
with financial and emotional consequences. Hypothetical 
bias is a well-documented problem of surveys,49 and may be 
particularly likely when questions involve unfamiliar or 
highly emotionally charged situations, as in the present 
example. It seems reasonable to expect, for example, that 
some individuals who profess unwillingness to pursue 
litigation under any circumstances might feel differently if 
faced with the actual emotional and financial toll of a serious 
injury. 
We must also be cautious about extrapolating from these 
survey responses to litigation attitudes more broadly. The 
survey describes a particular situation involving an injury 
sustained from a gunman in a stadium; whether the patterns 
in these data would persist across other settings or other 
forms of injury remains unknown. While it seems plausible 
that similar responses would arise if we examined attitudes 
towards mass shootings in similar locations, such as 
shopping malls, whether these results can guide thinking 
about other types of attacks, such as limited-scale violent 
actions by terrorists, is unclear.50  
Appendix A provides the complete text of the survey. 
Respondents were initially presented a scenario in which a 
gunman opens fire at a concert, injuring numerous 
spectators. Respondents were then asked whether they 
would advise a friend or loved one injured in the shooting to 
sue, and, if the answer was yes, were given a choice of five 
possible parties and asked to indicate which of those parties 
  
 49. See James J. Murphy et al., A Meta-Analysis of Hypothetical Bias in Stated 
Preference Valuation, 30 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 313, 313-15, 323 (2005). 
 50. This problem of external validity, however, is not unique to the survey 
approach. This problem would also present itself, if, for example, we chose to 
study the actual decisions of individuals in a specific setting where there was a 
VCF. 
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they would sue.51 Multiple responses were permitted. Finally, 
all respondents were offered an opportunity to explain their 
answer in text box. 
We fielded five versions of the survey. The first version 
indicated that the injured party had sustained $5000 in 
medical and economic losses from their injury, while the 
second version makes the amount of the losses $55,000. 
Version 3 includes additional text describing a VCF 
established by charitable organizations, corporate 
contributions, and private donations, and indicates that the 
victims suffering a $5000 loss had also received a $5000 
payment from the fund. Versions 4 and 5 also include a VCF, 
but vary the amount of loss and recovery. Table 1 














1 No $5000 N/A $5000 
2 No $55,000 N/A $55,000 
3 Yes $5000 $5000 $0 
4 Yes $55,000 $5000 $50,000 
5 Yes $55,000 $50,000 $5000 
Table 1: Survey Variants 
 
Because we are focusing on the role of compensation in 
shaping attitudes towards litigation, we have chosen to 
frame the losses in monetary terms without precisely 
specifying the nature of the injury. Clearly, one factor that 
can drive litigation is differences between plaintiffs and 
defendants in their views regarding the appropriate level of 
compensation for a particular injury. We have, to some 
degree, abstracted from such differences by specifying losses 
  
 51. Because the survey scenario involved violent victimization, we used a 
third-person framing as a means of distancing the respondent from the situation. 
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in dollar terms. Nevertheless, because we do not provide any 
information about non-economic losses, even with this 
narrower framing there remains some scope for individual 
interpretation regarding what constitutes adequate 
compensation. Nonetheless, had we identified particular 
types of injuries in the survey, it is possible that responses 
may have differed.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics describing the 
survey population for each of the five versions of the survey, 
along with p-values from a joint test for statistically 
significant differences in average characteristics across the 
five variants. With the exception of marital/relationship 
status, none of the demographic differences are statistically 
significant at conventional levels, and the practical 
differences are minor. These patterns suggest randomization 
was implemented successfully. An omnibus test for 
randomization fails to reject the null of successful 
randomization (p=.945).52 The apparent success of our 
randomization procedure provides confidence that any 
differences in responses across versions of the survey are 
attributable to the changes in conditions described in the 
survey and not to other factors. 
 
 




Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 P-Value 
Female .600 .589 .545 .595 .633 .271 
Hispanic .216 .212 .175 .161 .184 .341 
Black .125 .123 .089 .133 .111 .431 
Age (years) 48.9 49.3 49.7 49.9 50.4 .778 
Married .603 .656 .624 .528 .584 .020 
U.S. citizen .984 .967 .977 .978 .988 .447 
College degree .387 .427 .399 .370 .404 .684 
  
 52. We conducted this test by estimating a multinomial logistic model where 
the outcome was which of the five surveys was administered and the explanatory 
variables included age and age squared, number of household members, 
citizenship status, gender, and indicators for race/ethnicity (6 categories), family 
income (5 categories), educational attainment (5 categories), marital status (5 
categories), and employment status (4 categories). We tested for the joint 
significance of all the coefficients in the model. 
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Household size 2.29 2.19 2.14 2.23 2.15 .742 
Currently working .656 .669 .677 .646 .645 .892 
Annual family income 
>$50K .364 .414 .459 .399 .452 .096 
N 305 302 303 316 332  
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Survey Version 
Note: The final column of the table reports a p-value from a joint test of differences in means 
across any of the versions of the survey. 
III. RESULTS 
A. Quantitative Analysis of Responses 
Table 3 presents our main results, demonstrating how 
responses to the question about whether to pursue a lawsuit 
differ across the various versions of the survey. Across all 
versions of the survey, a majority of respondents express a 
willingness to pursue a suit, with approximately 90% of 
respondents favoring a lawsuit in Version 2 (a $55,000 loss 
with no fund), and 51% favoring a lawsuit in Version 3             
(a $5000 loss with a $5000 payment from the victim fund). 
We can statistically reject the hypothesis that rates of 
pursuing a lawsuit are the same across any two of the three 










1 $5K loss, no fund 85.2% [81.3% , 89.2%] 
2 $55K loss, no fund 89.7% [86.3% , 93.2%] 
3 $5K loss, VCF pays $5K 51.5% [45.8% , 57.1%] 
4 $55K loss, VCF pays $5K 86.4% [82.6% , 90.2%] 
5 $55K loss, VCF pays $50K 62.7% [57.4% , 67.9%] 
Table 3: Willingness to Sue by Survey Condition 
 
Several other patterns are notable in the data. First, in 
the versions of the survey where there is no VCF (Versions 1 
and 2), most respondents would pursue a lawsuit, but there 
is a non-negligible minority of 10–15% who say they would 
not recommend a suit, even with no obvious source of 
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compensation for their losses. Below we further explore this 
reluctance to recommend a suit by certain individuals. 
Second, the fraction of individuals who would recommend a 
suit is roughly the same in the first two versions of the 
survey, despite the fact that the loss in the first version is 
less than one-tenth as large as the loss in the second version. 
This suggests that factors other than the amount of loss may 
drive decisions to file suit, or alternatively, that losses above 
some de minimis level are likely to trigger a lawsuit. 
Are decisions to litigate driven primarily by 
uncompensated loss rather than total loss? Comparing 
Versions 2 and 4 of the survey, which have similar amounts 
of uncompensated loss ($55,000 versus $50,000), we see 
similar rates of litigation. However, only 63% of respondents 
to Version 5 of the survey—which featured $5000 in 
uncompensated loss—pursued litigation, whereas the rate of 
litigation was 85% in Version 1 of the survey, which had the 
same amount of uncompensated loss. This pattern suggests 
that respondents use their total loss as a reference point in 
thinking about adequacy of compensation, and that it is the 
performance relative to this benchmark rather than their 
absolute uncompensated loss that influences decisions to 
litigate. 
If decisions to litigate are made primarily with reference 
to reimbursement relative to baseline loss, we would expect 
a smaller fraction of respondents to pursue a suit in a variant 
with full compensation (a $5000 loss and a $5000 payment) 
than the variant with near full compensation (a $55,000 and 
a $50,000 payment), despite the fact that the latter group 
receives more in absolute dollars. The data reveal precisely 
such a pattern. Perhaps less expected is the fact that fully 
51% of respondents would pursue litigation even when their 
medical and wage losses had been fully compensated. We 
explore below the reasons given for pursuing litigation in 
such a situation. 
Table 4 reports coefficients from a linear probability 
regression53 where the outcome is whether an individual 
indicated that he or she would recommend a lawsuit, and the 
  
 53. Using non-linear alternatives, such as probit or logit, yields very similar 
results. 
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explanatory variables are the survey version and a set of 
demographic characteristics. The coefficients in this 
regression measure the expected change in the likelihood of 
advocating a suit associated with a particular characteristic, 
holding constant the other characteristics in the model. 
Consonant with the results in Table 3, Table 4 demonstrates 
large and statistically significant differences in willingness 
to pursue a suit across survey versions, with those being 
compensated for a higher fraction of their economic losses 
demonstrating less willingness to sue. 
Table 4 also reveals intriguing patterns across 
demographic groups in willingness to sue. Age, income, 
education, employment status, and family structure are not 
strong predictors of willingness to sue. However, women are 
about six percentage points less likely to recommend a suit 
than men. Relative to non-Hispanic Caucasians, African-
Americans are ten percentage points more likely to 
recommend a suit, Asians are sixteen percentage points more 
likely, and Hispanics are eight percentage points more likely. 
These differences cannot be explained by income, since this 
is also controlled in the model, and persist when we also 
control for state of residence. The precise explanation for 
these differences by gender and race/ethnicity remain 
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Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Survey version 
(reference: $5000 loss, no VCF) 
$55,000 loss, no VCF .049* 
(.028) 
$5000 loss, $5000 VCF payment -.327*** 
(.035) 
$55,000 loss, $5000 VCF payment .014 
(.028) 












# in household .001 
(.008) 
Employment status 








(reference: Less than HS) 
High School only -.013 
(.041) 
Some college, no bachelor’s -.004 
(.042) 
Bachelor’s degree -.053 
(.046) 
Advanced degree -.049 
(.051) 



































Table 4: Regression Estimates Relating Demographics to Willingness to Sue 
Note: The table reports coefficients from a linear probability regression model where the 
outcome is an 0/1 indicator for whether a particular survey respondent would sue. The 
explanatory variables include demographic characteristics of the respondents. The 
coefficients measure the difference in the expected probability of suing for someone with a 
particular characteristic relative to the reference group, or, for a continuous explanatory 
variable such as age, the difference in the expected probability of suit associated with a unit 
change in the explanatory variable. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote estimates that are statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Whom would respondents recommend suing? Table 5 
demonstrates that nearly four out of five respondents who 
would pursue a suit would target the gunman, and three out 
of five would target the security company. About half of 
respondents would sue the stadium owner. A smaller but 
non-negligible fraction of respondents would sue gun 
manufacturers or sellers. The fact that such a large fraction 
of respondents would pursue lawsuits against parties other 
than the gunman is perhaps surprising, and suggests that 
the general public might have fairly broad notions of 
responsibility in incidents such as this one. Interestingly, 
although the willingness to sue at all was affected by the 
presence of a fund and the amount of compensation provided, 
the choice of whom to sue was not at all affected by those 
variables. This pattern suggests that receiving compensation 
from a victim fund may not change recipients’ perceptions 
regarding culpability, even if it does alter their willingness to 
pursue formal legal action. Below we draw from the 
qualitative responses to provide further insight into decisions 




% Suing Across All 
Versions 




1 2 3 4 5 P-value 
Gunman 79.1% 77.3% 78.2% 80.1% 81.7% 78.4% .741 
Stadium 
owner 




24.8% 25.0% 21.8% 28.8% 28.6% 20.7% .153 
Gun seller/ 
manufacturer 
18.2% 16.2% 19.6% 17.9% 21.2% 15.4% .425 
Security 
company 
63.3% 63.5% 64.2% 59.0% 64.5% 63.5% .833 
Other 3.5% 4.2% 3.0% 5.1% 3.7% 1.9% .423 
Table 5: Target of Lawsuit by Survey Version 
Note: Percentages are conditional on indicating a willingness to sue, and more than one 
target can be selected. The final column of the table reports a p-value from a joint test of 
differences in means across any of the versions of the survey. 
 
Appendix Table A1 reports regression coefficients from a 
model where we explain the total number of parties targeted 
as a function of demographic characteristics, limiting the 
analysis to those who would recommend a suit. Consistent 
with the findings in Table 4, which showed that after 
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controlling for other characteristics, women are less willing 
to sue and African-Americans are more willing to sue; in this 
specification we see that women would target fewer parties, 
and African-Americans would target more. There is also 
suggestive evidence that the number of parties targeted 
increases with education. 
Our experimental survey results provide a number of 
insights into how VCFs shape attitudes towards litigation. 
Our results support Feinberg’s argument that VCFs reduce 
willingness to litigate, even when receipt of VCF funds does 
not require a waiver of the right to sue.54 Additionally, the 
data clearly indicates that the amount of compensation 
provided by the VCF matters, with evidence suggesting that 
victims measure adequacy of compensation in comparison to 
the amount of loss.  
B. Qualitative Analysis of Responses 
We next draw from the free-form text respondents used 
to explain their answers to gain additional insights regarding 
attitudes towards litigation following a shooting. Ninety-four 
percent of respondents provided an explanation for their 
answers, a proportion that did not vary systematically by 
survey version. Most offered a sentence or two of explanation, 
with an occasional longer, more detailed response. 
Additionally, since many respondents offered similar 
explanations for the choices regarding whether to sue, we 
categorized and coded the free-form responses as an 
additional means of exploring respondents’ attitudes.  
Why do some respondents choose to not recommend a 
suit, even when there is no VCF present and there are 
substantial losses? Throughout all versions of the survey, 
respondents who advocated not suing provided four common 
explanations. First, some respondents indicated that attacks 
such as the one outlined in the scenario were akin to random 
accidents that are a feature of everyday life, and therefore 
felt that no one could be really held responsible through 
  
 54. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT 81 (2012) (arguing that the Hokie 
Spirit Memorial Fund, which did not require a lawsuit waiver, reduced victims’ 
willingness to pursue litigation).  
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litigation. Figure 1 categorizes and depicts these types of 
responses as “risks of life,” and shows that between roughly 
5% and 18% of respondents who would not sue cited this as a 
reason, depending on the version of the survey. Illustrative 
responses in this vein include: 
This is a random act. To me it is like a crazy freak accident. How 
can you sue a crazy person[?] 
Who are the responsible parties? When you freely attend an event 
where many people are present, it is impossible to be guaranteed 
complete safety. 
Any time you go somewhere there is always a possibility of 
something happening. I would imagine the people putting on the 
event would have checked people entering. We can’t file lawsuits 
for everything. 
Second, Figure 1 reports a smaller number of 
respondents as being “opposed to lawsuits.” Across all 
versions of the survey, 11% of respondents cited this as a 
reason not to sue. In this category, respondents generally 
cited adverse social consequences of lawsuits as a reason not 
to sue, for example: 
America, the land of the free and frivolous law suits. I’m not sure 
that we can do much more at our public venues to prevent/protect 
against the sick minded killers in society. Unfortunately in the 
shadow of tragedies like this scenario, folks attempt to use the 
‘system’ to get rich. I am not trying to sound unsympathetic, but 
someone is going to fund these payouts. It all comes back to the 
consumer eventually. 
[I]n a situation like that, it becomes a circus, where ambulance 
chasing lawyers are pushing clients to file, then to settle, so that 
the lawyers can get paid. [I]t prolongs the grief as the lawyers and 
media rush to exploit the victims, and does nothing to really help 
the victims. 
A third common explanation was that respondents 
recognized the shooter as likely being judgment proof. 
Depending on the survey version, Figure 1 reports that 
anywhere between 4% to 13% of respondents cited this as an 
explanation for not wanting to pursue litigation. Typical 
responses that fell in this category of explanations include: 
I believe that there is no chance that anyone would be able to collect 
from the gunman. The gunman probably has issues that would 
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prevent them from having money, so suing them would be 
pointless . . . . 
I believe the only responsible party is the shooter him/herself, and 
I doubt that all of the victims, even if they should file a lawsuit, 
would be able to collect any money from the shooter. Thus, I think 
that the cost of filing a lawsuit for my ‘friend’ would be a waste, as 
there would be nothing to collect. 
The fourth reason cited for not suing was a concern over 
litigation costs. In the scenarios where the uncompensated 
loss was $5000 (Versions 1 and 5), many voiced concern about 
whether lawyers’ fees or other litigation costs would be more 
than the actual amount of recovery. In particular, Figure 1 
shows a large majority of respondents in Version 1 cited 
“litigation costs” as a reason not to sue and that over 40% in 
Version 5 of the survey concurred. Responses concerning 
litigation costs include:  
It would cost much more than $5000 to try to get the money from 
the responsible parties. It would not be worth the trouble. 
I would not recommend to pursue a lawsuit of [$]5000 because the 
attorney fees would probably be more than what you would walk 
away with. 
Others who cited litigation costs as a reason for not suing 
focused on the emotional and psychic costs of litigation: 
It’s so much more hassle, time, money and energy to pursue a 
lawsuit. Yes[,] in the end, you might get more money, but at what 
cost emotionally[?] 
To go through a law[suit] would take an additional toll on a person. 
It is time to heal and not dwell on the past. 
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Figure 1: Explanations Provided by Respondents  
Who Would Not Pursue Litigation 
Note: This figure reports the authors’ tabulations of the free-form responses explaining why 
victims choose not to pursue litigation. The tabulations are limited to those with usable 
responses, and the response categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
This reasoning regarding costs was much less apparent 
among those responding to the version of the survey with a 
$55,000 or $50,000 loss (Versions 2 and 4), and may help to 
explain why the VCF can provide a means of reducing 
litigation. Figure 1 shows that when compared to 
respondents who incurred $5000 in losses (survey Versions 1 
and 5), respondents who incurred $50,000 to $55,000 in 
losses (Versions 2 and 4) were significantly less likely to cite 
litigation costs as a reason not to sue. These patterns suggest 
that some respondents view pursuing litigation as involving 
fairly high fixed costs that were only worth sustaining if 
there was the possibility of a commensurate payoff. Even if a 
VCF does not provide full compensation, to the extent that it 
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narrows the gap between loss and compensation to a level 
closer to what is perceived as representing the fixed cost of 
litigation, it may deter lawsuits.  
As suggested by the quantitative results, the free-form 
responses indicated that the amount of compensation 
provided by the fund is important. As two respondents to 
Version 4 of the survey who supported filing suit stated 
succinctly: 
Receiving $5000 is not much compared to losing $55,000. 
The $5000 compensated from the victims’ fund is way too little. 
Moreover, only four of forty-four respondents to Version 
4 of the survey who chose not to sue and explained their 
answer indicated that the payment from the VCF influenced 
their decision to forego a lawsuit. Overall, the pattern of 
explanations offered in Version 4 of the survey were largely 
similar to those for Version 2, again suggesting that an overly 
small VCF payment exerts little effect on judgments 
regarding whether to pursue litigation and whom to target. 
In contrast, Figure 1 shows that many respondents who 
received full or almost full compensation for their economic 
loss (Versions 3 and 5) and were unwilling to recommend a 
suit, found compensation to be sufficient. In particular, some 
respondents felt that it would be unfair and selfish to sue. 
For example: 
You already got what was compensated to you, why would you want 
to be greedy and pursue for more. Being greedy will not lead to 
nothing good.  
The purpose of a civil lawsuit is to recover actual damages that the 
litigant has sustained. A lawsuit should not be a source of money 
beyond what is necessary to restore a person to health or go back to 
work. 
These responses are consistent with prior scholarship 
emphasizing the compensation function of the tort system.55 
In short, VCFs that can provide full or nearly full 
  
 55. See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort 
Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 585, 629-30 (2003); Priest, supra note 35, at 5. 
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compensation can reduce the likelihood that victims will feel 
a need to resort to litigation.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum from those who 
would not pursue a suit, even following a substantial loss and 
no compensation, are those who indicate they would sue even 
when fully compensated for economic loss. One of the more 
striking patterns in the survey is the fact that more than half 
of respondents in Versions 3 and 5 of the survey—where 
compensation for economic loss was at or near 100%—
expressed a willingness to pursue a lawsuit. The high rate of 
lawsuits suggests that compensation is only one reason 
among many that citizens may wish to access the tort system. 
Respondents who would pursue a lawsuit cited two 
predominant reasons for their behavior. The first was a 
desire to assign responsibility to those parties viewed as 
being at fault, and in some cases to pursue retribution 
against such parties. Figure 2 categorizes these responses as 
“accountability/retribution,” and reports that in all versions 
of the survey, this category accounted for at least 60% of all 
explanations provided by respondents who were willing to 
sue. For these respondents, litigation was less about 
receiving money than ensuring accountability and inflicting 
punishment. Representative responses along these lines 
include: 
The injuries that people sustained are life-changing and disrupt 
their overall wellbeing especially their sense of peace and safety. 
For this reason, the people responsible should be held accountable 
by filing a lawsuit. 
A civil suit against the gunman would punish the gunman by 
depleting him/her of any assets that otherwise would not be 
affected by a criminal conviction. 
Automatic payment does not punish the shooter. Hitting the pocket 
book does. 
These responses are consistent with findings in the literature 
more broadly, namely, that plaintiffs’ objectives in litigation 
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can be driven by the desire for accountability56 or to inflict 
punishment on a wrongdoer.57  
It remains unclear whether such attitudes would persist 
in a real-life scenario in which there was more information 
and publicity surrounding the criminal prosecution of the 
gunman. For example, in a situation more akin to the Boston 
Marathon bombing, where one of the alleged perpetrators 
was seriously injured during a police pursuit and now faces 
the death penalty if convicted, victims might view the 
criminal justice system as providing adequate retribution 
without the need to impose additional penalties through the 
civil justice system. On the other hand, several respondents 
cited a need to hold other parties responsible who likely 
would not fall under the purview of the criminal justice 
system. For example, one respondent noted: 
Corporations that sell guns should be responsible for the negative 
actions that come from their products. 
It is possible that such a concern could only be addressed 
through a civil suit. 
Beyond assigning responsibility and inflicting 
punishment, the other main reason cited for pursuing 
litigation was a desire for compensation. We categorized 
responses desiring some kind of payment as “[i]nadequately 
compensated” under Figure 2, which also shows that across 
all survey versions, at least 25% of respondents who pursue 
a suit did so to obtain additional compensation. Interestingly, 
Figure 2 reveals relatively little variation across survey 
  
 56. See Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661; Tyler, supra note 39, at 202-03. 
 57. See Relis, supra note 36, at 363 fig.4. Take for example a respondent in 
Hadfield’s study who had opted for litigation rather than a payment from the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. The litigant indicated that pursuing 
a tort claim was  
one way of saying no, it wasn’t just the terrorists. There was a lot of 
ordinary negligence that led to people’s deaths . . . . It’s not just about 
the facts; there is a need to bring those facts to accountability . . . . 
. . . . 
What I’m looking for is justice—someone held accountable for the 
murder. There are people who did not do their job. No one has been fired, 
demoted.  
Hadfield, supra note 17, at 662 (first alteration in original). 
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versions in the proportion of respondents who cite inadequate 
compensation; it is not the case that respondents who 
received more from the VCF who would have ultimately 
chosen to sue were appreciably less concerned about 
adequacy of compensation. However, it is worth noting that 
because these responses are conditional on being willing to 
pursue a suit in the first place, all these data indicate is that 
among those who would sue, their reasons for doing so seem 
roughly comparable across survey conditions. 
Many responses related to inadequate compensation 
focused on insuring against potential future unforeseen 
costs, particularly when VCF compensation was at or near 
economic loss (Versions 3 and 5). For example, one 
respondent succinctly stated: 
I feel compensation is justified for future unfor[e]seen 
complications. 
Others replied in a similar vein:  
A lawsuit should be pursued because of the probability of medical 
and/or mental issues that have yet to surface. 
 
Figure 2: Explanations Provided By Respondents Who Would Pursue Litigation 
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Note: This figure reports the authors’ tabulations of the free-form responses 
explaining why victims choose to pursue litigation. The tabulations are limited to 
those with usable responses, and the response categories are not mutually exclusive. 
I would imagine that there would be trauma and treatment 
necessary (including psychological) beyond the immediate wage 
loss and first year of medical treatment. 
These specific responses point to a possible dilemma 
facing those who design victim funds. Architects of such 
funds, most notably Ken Feinberg, have argued that 
providing prompt payment should be a major objective of the 
funds in order to reduce uncertainty and allow victims to 
move on as quickly as possible.58 However, payments made 
before the full extent of injuries is realized may leave victims 
in the position of wishing to pursue litigation later to recover 
future unforeseen losses.  
The qualitative responses also provide insights into the 
choice of whom to sue. Many respondents viewed the stadium 
owner and security company as sharing culpability with the 
gunman, because they could have prevented the incident if 
they had screened attendees better or taken more active 
security precautions. For example, 
The owner of the stadium and security guards had a responsibility 
to the attendees to provide a safe environment—they did not. They 
could be held accountable for the safety of their patrons. And the 
gunman could obviously be sued because he broke the law and 
injured people. 
Similarly, another respondent noted: 
I would advise my friend to sue them because security and the 
owner of the stadium were not properly protecting the public from 
guns. This could have be[en] prevented, yet people were injured due 
to inefficient security and the stadium owners. 
The responses that focus on the possibility of using the 
tort system to prompt behavioral change echo work by Gillian 
  
 58. See FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 79-81, 159-64; see also Mark Arsenault & 
Todd Wallack, One Fund Payments will Include Those Treated as Outpatients, 
BOS. GLOBE (May 15, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/2013/05/15/one-fund-
payments-will-include-those-treated-hospital-outpatients/y0rsHCwTEgx5s
JZJLARwiI/story.html.  
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Hadfield, whose study featured respondents who thought 
that litigation (as opposed to the alternative—the 9/11 Victim 
Compensation Fund) might give them the opportunity to 
enable “responsive policy change—making sure that lessons 
were learned and heeded in the future.”59 
Whether similar attitudes would arise in other shootings 
or mass-casualty events may depend in part on the type of 
facility where an event occurred. The Aurora, Newtown, Ft. 
Hood, and Navy Yard shootings seem similar to the survey 
scenario in that these events occurred in a facility with 
controlled access, which likely provides bystanders with a 
greater expectation regarding security. Virginia Tech 
provides a sort of intermediate case where the shootings 
occurred on private property but in a facility where public 
access is not restricted; shopping malls, restaurants, and 
other retail spaces offer other examples. The Boston bombing 
occurred in a location that was completely open to the public. 
It is unclear whether views regarding the culpability of the 
property owner or security providers would persist in 
scenarios occurring in more public spaces. 
Perhaps somewhat contrary to intuition, among those 
who would pursue a suit, nearly one in five would not target 
the gunman. The qualitative responses reveal a perhaps 
surprising degree of understanding regarding the fact that 
the gunman is likely judgment-proof, meaning that actually 
receiving compensation would necessitate including other 
parties in the lawsuit. Two illustrative comments on this 
score were: 
It depends on my friend[’]s situation. If he or she was so desperate 
for money, like about to lose their home I’d say yes pursue a lawsuit. 
But the person to blame is the shooter and most likely they wouldn’t 
have the money to pay in a law suit;” and “[t]he gunman is the one 
responsible for his actions, regardless if he is likely to have less 
money than the other options. 
Although not a widespread view, as for the first 
respondent above, some expressed willingness to sue parties 
they did not necessarily view as culpable in order to ensure 
that compensation was sufficient. For example, one 
  
 59. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 648.  
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respondent who chose to sue all of the listed parties in the 
survey explained the response as follows: 
It would be necessary to sue all parties involved[,] . . . the injured 
should be compensated for their injuries [and] suing each of them 
increases chan[c]es of getting compensation. 
Another respondent who indicated willingness to sue the 
security company stated: 
I would want to be compensated for my injuries, [a]lthough you 
can’t really blame anyone for someone else[’]s actions. 
To summarize, our qualitative analysis reveals a number 
of factors that affect the expected amount of litigation in the 
wake of a mass shooting. Some fraction of the population 
profess unwillingness to sue despite incurring 
uncompensated losses, primarily due to either a belief that 
random injuries are an unavoidable feature of life, and 
therefore not deserving of special compensation, or a view 
that lawsuits generate undesirable social consequences. 
Respondents also pointed to high-perceived financial and 
emotional costs of litigation relative to expected returns and 
a likelihood that the gunman was judgment-proof as barriers 
to pursuing recovery in the courts. 
Among those who would pursue a lawsuit, the most 
commonly cited reason for doing so was to ensure that 
culpability was properly assigned to responsible parties 
and/or that these parties were appropriately penalized. 
These latter findings reinforce results from the existing 
work, where plaintiffs “stress[ ] that they sued not for money, 
but rather for principles,”60 including the principles of 
accountability, punishment, and acknowledgement of harm.61 
Additionally, a non-negligible proportion of those who would 
pursue litigation were motivated by a desire to ensure that 
their losses are fully compensated. Many respondents were 
sensitive to the possibility that payments made shortly after 
a loss might not be sufficient to cover unforeseen future 
complications, and advocated litigation as a hedge against 
potential future costs, even if compensation was already 
  
 60. Relis, supra note 36, at 383. 
 61. Id. at 363 fig.4. 
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generous. The availability of comparatively “deep pockets” 
also appeared to promote litigation among a subset of 
respondents. 
These responses broadly suggest conditions that may 
affect the ability of VCFs to achieve one oft-cited policy goal 
of reducing post-event litigation. Given that many cited 
accountability and retribution as primary reasons for 
pursuing litigation, litigation may be less likely in situations 
where the perpetrator is killed or the criminal justice system 
is viewed as providing sufficient retribution against 
wrongdoers. Many respondents who expressed a willingness 
to sue due to inadequate compensation cited the potential for 
future complications as an important factor, suggesting that 
VCFs may perform differently depending on whether injuries 
are well-defined at the time of payment and the likelihood of 
future complications is low. Even if VCFs lack the resources 
to fully compensate individuals for injuries, partial 
compensation may in some cases reduce litigation because 
many individuals view participation in the court system as 
carrying appreciable fixed monetary and emotional costs, 
and are therefore willing to forego litigation even when there 
is some uncompensated loss. However, if VCF payments are 
too small relative to loss, they may leave litigation rates 
largely unchanged. Finally, the substantial number of 
respondents who would pursue a lawsuit even when fully 
compensated for economic loss suggests there may be limits 
to the extent to which VCFs on their own can foreclose 
litigation. 
C. How Do Survey Responses Compare to Real-World 
Behavior?  
The surveys provide interesting insights regarding how 
VCFs could affect attitudes towards litigation, but the 
usefulness of these data for policy purposes depend in part on 
how well the findings from surveys such as ours generalize to 
real-world behavior. In this Section, we review seven recent 
VCFs that have arisen in the wake of mass injury events that 
bear some similarity to the scenario presented in our survey, 
and qualitatively examine what is known about litigation 
following those events. Consonant with the findings of our 
survey, the experience with recent VCFs suggest that 
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monetary compensation is an important factor shaping 
attitudes towards litigation, but it is not necessarily the only 
determinant of whether victims choose to sue. Victims who 
do sue cite many of the same reasons for pursuing legal action 
as were cited in our survey, including a desire for 
accountability and concerns over future injury, while those 
who do not sue often cite the financial and emotional costs of 
tort litigation. Moreover, we see some suggestive evidence 
that litigation is more likely following events where VCF 
compensation is limited or non-existent. In short, recent 
historical experience appears to corroborate a number of the 
empirical findings from our survey.  
1. Oklahoma City Community Foundation Disaster 
Relief Fund 
Following the Oklahoma City bombing at the Alfred P. 
Murrah federal building, the Oklahoma City Community 
Foundation Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) was established to 
collect donations and distribute relief.62 To this day, the fund 
is still in existence.63 Because donor intent varied, the DRF is 
actually comprised of several sub-funds, each serving a 
different purpose for victims.64 As a whole, the fund generally 
pays for unmet medical expenses, funeral expenses, utilities, 
car payments, mortgages, rent, etc.65 Additionally, a large 
portion of the funds are earmarked to assist children of the 
deceased with educational expenses for undergraduate and 
vocational schooling.66 In total, the fund has received 
$14,688,61167 and has doled out $7,295,071 directly to 1033 
victims.68 Eighteen years after the bombing, the fund still had 
  
 62. BKD LLP, OKLAHOMA CITY DISASTER RELIEF FUND, INC.: FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION REPORT 8-10 (2013), http://www.occf.org/documents/Oklahoma
CityDisasterReliefFdreportissued3-20-13.pdf.  
 63. Oklahoma City Disaster Relief Fund, OKLA. CITY COMMUNITY FOUND.,             
http://www.occf.org/drf (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 64. BKD LLP, supra note 62, at 18. 
 65. Id. at 21.  
 66. Id. at 23.  
 67. Id. at 20. 
 68. Id. at 26.  
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a $10,000,000 account balance from investment income and 
earmarked donations.69 
The DRF differs from more recent funds in several 
respects. The DRF does not make direct lump sum payments, 
rather, the fund assesses victims’ needs and then 
compensates after other funding sources have been 
exhausted.70 For example, the DRF will pay for unmet 
medical expenses related to the bombing when insurance 
does not cover costs.71 Other funds discussed below, however, 
give victims a one time payment based solely on their 
injuries, which can be spent for any purpose. DRF funds have 
also been used to provide outputs such as scholarships that 
are not directly tied to economic loss from the event itself.72  
Victims groups have expressed dismay at the fund’s large 
remaining balance, and, by implication, the fact that the fund 
has paid out less in compensation than it could have.73 
Indeed, frustrated victims sued the Oklahoma Governor and 
Oklahoma City Mayor over the administration and 
distribution of funds donated after the bombing. While there 
have only been a handful of lawsuits related to the bombing,74 
  
 69. Id. at 20.  
 70. Id. at 16-17, 23.  
 71. Id. at 22-23. 
 72. Id. at 23-25. 
 73. Randy Ellis, Oklahoma City Bombing Fund Officials Say Criticism Unjust, 
NEWSOK (Nov. 12, 2012), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-city-bombing-fund-official
s-say-criticism-unjust/article/3727548/?page=1; OKLAHOMAN EDITORIAL BD., 
Audit Should End Talk of Oklahoma City Bombing Fund Being Mismanaged, 
NEWSOK (Mar. 24, 2013), http://newsok.com/audit-should-end-talk-of-oklahoma-
city-bombing-fund-being-mismanaged/article/3769340/?page=1; see also BKD 
LLP, supra note 62, at 20-23 (describing the substantial remaining balance of the 
relief fund). 
 74. Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 160 F.3d 613, 613-18 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Gaines-Tabb v. Mid-Kansas Coop. Ass’n, 980 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (D. Kan. 1997); 
Ed Godfrey, Day-Care Center, ATF, Chemical Firm Sued, NEWSOK (Apr. 19, 
1997), http://newsok.com/day-care-center-atf-chemical-firm-sued/article/257647
6; Ed Godfrey, Lawsuit Seeks Accounting for Disaster Donations, NEWSOK (June 
28, 1995), http://newsok.com/lawsuit-seeks-accounting-for-disaster-donations/art
icle/2506849; Ellie Sutter, Last Rescued Victim Files $4 Million Suit, NEWSOK 
(May 12, 1995), http://newsok.com/last-rescued-victim-files-4-million-suit/article/
2502246. 
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at least two were class actions involving over three-hundred 
plaintiffs.75 
Some Oklahoma bombing victims also pursued lawsuits 
as a means of achieving accountability for the attacks. While 
prosecutors convicted and sentenced three perpetrators for 
the bombing, some victims were not satisfied by the answers 
provided from the criminal trials.76 Consequently, several 
victims sued the country of Iraq in 2002, alleging Ramzi 
Yousef, a convicted terrorist, was an Iraqi government agent 
who recruited the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrators to 
conduct terrorist attacks in the United States.77 In short, the 
U.S. government’s investigation and criminal trials may not 
have provided enough accountability in the eyes of some 
victims.  
2. Mile High United Way Healing Fund 
The Mile High United Way created the Healing Fund the 
day of the Columbine High School shooting.78 The fund raised 
about $4,600,000 for the victims.79 Unlike the DRF, this fund 
distributed several lump sum payments to the victims to be 
spent as they chose.80 Initial payments included $50,000 each 
for the thirteen families of the deceased, $150,000 each to 
four victims who suffered brain and spinal injuries, and 
$10,000 each to twenty-one other physically injured victims.81 
The fund reportedly distributed an additional $1,115,000 to 
  
 75. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 160 F.3d at 613; Gaines-Tabb v. Mid-
Kansas Coop. Ass’n, 980 F. Supp. at 1426. 
 76. See Jennifer L. Brown, Oklahoma Victims Sue Iraq, FAYETTEVILLE 
OBSERVER, Mar. 21, 2002, at 11A, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1559&
dat=20020321&id=Rm05AAAAIBAJ&sjid=eykMAAAAIBAJ&pg=1347,
18268871. 
 77. Lawton v. Republic of Iraq, 581 F. Supp. 2d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 78. WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, THE REPORT OF GOVERNOR BILL OWENS’ COLUMBINE 
REVIEW COMMISSION 133 (2001), http://trac.state.co.us/Documents/Reports%20
and%20Publications/Columbine_2001_Governor_Review_Commission.pdf.  
 79. Id. at 133 n.270. 
 80. See id. at 133 n.271 
 81. Id. 
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twelve of the most seriously injured victims.82 In total, about 
$2,575,000 went to victims and their families in the form of 
lump sum payments. The remaining funds, amounting to 
millions of dollars, went to nonprofits administering outreach 
programs, victim services, and other community programs.83  
Soon after the Healing Fund began collecting a 
significant amount of donations, victims expressed varied 
opinions over how they felt the funds should be distributed.84 
Some believed the money should be divided equally, while 
others felt the money should be distributed based on the 
victims’ actual needs.85 Tensions reached the point where 
representatives of the victims met with fund administrators 
to address the conflicting concerns.86 Ultimately, fund 
administrators and victims reached a compromise because a 
little over half of the funds were directed to victims and the 
rest to service providers and community programs.87  
Seventeen lawsuits ultimately followed the Columbine 
shooting,88 and both the need for compensation and desire to 
assign blame to responsible parties appear to have factored 
into victims’ calculations regarding whether to sue. While 
some victims did accept settlements from the defendants,89 
  
 82. Id.  
 83. See id.; see also Dana Liebelson, CHARTS: Where Did the Money Donated 
to Columbine, Aurora, and Virginia Tech Mass-Shooting Victims Go?, MOTHER 
JONES (Apr. 8, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/
where-does-money-donated-victims-mass-shootings-go (noting that the Healing 
Fund took in roughly $4.5 million from charitable donations following the 
Columbine shooting). 
 84.  Kieran Nicholson & Jim Kirksey, Feelings Healed Over Healing Fund, 
DENVER POST (May 27, 1999), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/shot0527a.htm. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. ERICKSON, supra note 78, at 133 n.271. 
 88. Chelsea Kelly, Mass Shooting Lawsuits Can Serve Purpose, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Feb. 4, 2014), http://articles.courant.com/2014-02-04/news/hc-op-fresh-
talk-kelly-mass-shooting-lawsuits-usef-20140204_1_columbine-lawsuits-erin-
peterson-julia-pryde. 
 89. Michael Janofsky, $2.53 Million Deal Ends Some Columbine Lawsuits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/us/2.53-million-
deal-ends-some-columbine-lawsuits.html.  
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others pushed forward, seeking accountability.90 For 
instance, some victims refused to accept settlements from the 
parents of the two gunmen, insisting that they wanted 
answers for their behavior.91 One family in particular, who 
sued the parents of the gunmen for $250 million, indicated 
that their suit was not about money but was instead focused 
on assigning blame for the parents’ negligent behavior and 
preventing similar future tragedies.92 Others sued the 
principal and several teachers of Columbine High School, 
stating these officials knew of the gunmen’s violent 
tendencies and should have taken action.93 Ultimately, these 
victims never obtained accountability, as their suit was 
dismissed based upon a judgment that the school officials 
were protected by government immunity.94 
3. Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund 
Established after a student killed thirty-two people at 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), the Hokie 
Spirit Memorial Fund collected and distributed over $7 
million in donations to victims.95 Unlike the funds discussed 
above, nearly all proceeds went directly to the victims in the 
form of lump sum payments. Families of the thirty-two 
deceased received $208,000 and forty-eight victims who were 
physically injured or present at the scene of the shooting 
received an average payment of $35,668.75.96 Upon receipt of 
  
 90. See id. 
 91. See id.  
 92. Columbine Lawsuits May Go Beyond Shooters’ Parents, CNN (May 27, 
1999, 7:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/27/columbine.lawsuit.04; $250 
Million Columbine Lawsuit Filed, CNN (May 27, 1999, 1:23 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/US/9905/27/columbine.lawsuit.02. 
 93. Julia Campbell, Principal and School Officials Named in Columbine Suit, 
ABC NEWS (July 20, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=96453&page=1. 
 94. Most Columbine Lawsuits Dismissed, CBS (Apr. 29, 2009, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-319250.html. 
 95. FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 202. 
 96. Id.  
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payment, victims did not waive their right to litigation.97 
Thus, victims could take the money and sue for even more. 
Only two victims of the approximately two hundred 
potential claimants sued the university in connection with 
the shooting.98 One explanation for the paucity of suits may 
be that victims found compensation from the Fund to be 
adequate; some commentators, including the Fund’s 
administrator, Ken Feinberg, have argued that the Fund 
made a significant impact.99 An alternative explanation is 
that the stringent nature of Virginia’s tort law, which caps 
damages against the state at $100,000, was the primary 
determining factor rather than the Fund.100 However, the two 
explanations are not fully exclusive—if victims utilized a 
cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to sue, and weighed 
potential recovery in a suit against unmet needs for 
compensation and the costs of litigation, the presence of the 
fund may have tipped the scale against litigation, 
particularly given the limited availability of damages.101 
Both plaintiffs were successful at the trial court level.102 
In the initial judgment, the jury found the State was 
negligent and awarded the plaintiffs $4 million, which was 
subsequently reduced to $100,000 by the trial court and 
eventually overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court.103 
Nevertheless, victims felt some vindication from the jury’s 
verdict. One parent of a slain Virginia Tech student stated 
that the lawsuit was about accountability, not money, and 
“still t[ook] a good measure of satisfaction that the jury 
listened to all of the evidence and decided as it did. We don’t 
  
 97. Id. at 81. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2007); see also FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 81. 
 101. See FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 81. 
 102. J. Freedom du Lac, Va. Supreme Court Overturns Verdict in Wrongful 




 103. Id. The Court reasoned that the State did not have a duty to warn Virginia 
Tech students of the potential for violent acts by the shooter. Id. 
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feel at all that the Supreme Court can take that away from 
us.”104  
Another measure of accountability may have come from 
the U.S. Department of Education, which found in 2012—
after payments from the VCF had been made but before the 
two lawsuits over the tragedy had been resolved—that 
Virginia Tech violated the Clery Act and fined the 
university.105 The Clery Act requires universities to issue 
timely warnings of threats to students, and the Department 
of Education found Virginia Tech failed to properly warn 
students after the gunman committed his first attack on the 
campus that day.106 Like the jury verdict finding Virginia 
Tech negligent, this administrative finding may have 
provided the accountability and satisfaction some victims 
desired. Administrative processes such as this could provide 
a means of accountability without incurring the costs of 
litigation. 
4. Association of the United States Army Fort Hood 
Shooting Fund 
On November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S. Army 
officer, shot and killed thirteen soldiers and civilians and 
wounded more than thirty-two others at Fort Hood, Texas.107 
Immediately after the shooting, the Fort Hood chapter of the 
Association of the United States Army (AUSA), a non-profit 
group, established a modest VCF for the victims.108 The 
AUSA collected $1 million, but as of November 2013, had not 
  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-30-SF,        
at 3-4 (Aug. 30, 2012). 
 107. Moni Basu, As Hasan Trial Starts, Fort Hood Victims Feel Betrayed, CNN 
(Aug. 11, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/10/us/fort-hood-victims/
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 108. Fort Hood Tragedy: How You Can Help Right Now, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/05/help-fort-
hood-victims-do_n_347821.html. 
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yet distributed funds to the victims.109 Thus, the Fort Hood 
shooting provides an example of an event with qualitative 
similarities to other mass injury events examined here, but 
that involved no real VCF compensation in the first three 
years post-event. 
Our survey responses suggest that lawsuits are more 
likely in an environment in which no VCF money is available, 
and the Fort Hood experience thus far seems to support that 
conclusion. Motivated in part by concern about the level of 
compensation being provided by the federal government for 
their injuries, a number of survivors filed a civil suit which 
named the U.S. Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the Department of Defense, Nidal Hasan, and Anwar 
al-Awlaki’s estate as defendants.110 Many Americans saw the 
shooting as a terrorist attack because Hasan’s motivation for 
the shooting was to defend the Taliban111 and because he 
consulted frequently with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical cleric 
affiliated with Al Qaeda.112 Nevertheless, the Army initially 
designated the shooting as workplace violence.113 This 
classification denied survivors access to additional benefits 
provided to soldiers and civilians wounded in a theater of 
combat.114 Hence, the survivors sued to have the incident 
  
 109. Fort Hood Charity Tight-Lipped About $1M collected, CBS DFW (Nov. 3, 
2013, 8:42 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/11/03/fort-hood-charity-tight-lipped-
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 110. Charley Keyes, Victims of Fort Hood Shooting Sue the Army for $750 
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 112. Larry Shaughnessy, Hasan’s Email Exchange with al-Awlaki; Islam, 
Money and Matchmaking, CNN (July 20, 2012, 12:32 AM), http://security.blogs.
cnn.com/2012/07/20/hasans-e-mail-exchange-with-al-awlaki-islam-money-and-
matchmaking. 
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re-designated as an enemy attack115 and in February 2015, 
the Army relented and announced that it would award the 
Purple Heart and its civilian equivalent, the Defense of 
Freedom Medal, to shooting victims.116 
The civil complaint in the Fort Hood case also suggests 
that some litigants are motivated by a desire to establish 
clearer accountability for the event. Prior to the shooting, 
Hasan consulted by email with Anwar al-Awlaki about the 
religious justifications for killing unarmed people.117 
Accordingly, survivors, in their lawsuit against Awlaki’s 
estate, allege that he was responsible for the shooting 
because he inspired Hasan to carry out the attack.118 
Additionally, because the FBI was monitoring the email 
communication between the two,119 the survivors argue that 
the Bureau shares some responsibility for not preventing the 
attack.120 Furthermore, the survivors’ complaint alleges 
Army officials disregarded troubling signs of Hasan’s 
radicalism by ignoring disturbing reports by his peers.121 In 
short, a court judgment establishing fault on behalf of the 
defendants, or a settlement where the defendants admit 
fault, could provide the justice and accountability survivors 
seek in addition to compensation. 
5. Tucson Together Fund 
The Tucson Together Fund was an amalgamation of 
three charitable relief funds established after the January 8, 
2011 shooting by Jared Loughner in Tucson, Arizona.122 The 
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attack left six dead and thirteen wounded.123 Among the 
victims was the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for 
Arizona, John Roll, who was killed, and U.S. Representative 
Gabrielle Giffords, who was severely wounded.124 The fund 
received over $500,000125 and worked in conjunction with two 
other compensation sources: Arizona’s Victim Compensation 
Program and a federal Anti-Terrorism Relief Grant.126 The 
fund compensated victims for expenses not covered by these 
two other sources, such as lost wages, funeral expenses, and 
travel expenses.127 To provide quick relief, the fund 
distributed several small lump sum payments “intended for 
personal incidental expenses not covered by a government 
program or fund.”128 In all, the fund distributed $454,500 in 
lump sum payments, $31,142 for lost wages, $15,970 for 
victim travel expenses, $6943 for funeral expenses, and 
$4512 for additional counseling expenses.129 
Surprisingly, there has been little controversy involving 
the Fund, nor to our knowledge have there been lawsuits 
regarding liability for the shooting. We posit several possible 
explanations for this behavior that are consistent with our 
survey findings. First, victims may have felt that 
compensation, or at least the process of receiving 
compensation, was fair. Because there were relatively few 
victims compared to other VCFs, and the fund set procedures 
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 126. See id.  
 127. See Nicole Brophy, Spring Training Game to Benefit Victims of Tuscon 
Tragedy, ARIZ. FOOTHILLS MAG., http://www.arizonafoothillsmagazine.com/tucson
/tucson-travel-and-leisure/1916-spring-training-game-to-benefit-victims-of-
tuscon-tragedy.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).  
 128. See BURBANK, supra note 122, at 7.  
 129. E-mail from Kent Burbank, Dir. of Victim Servs., Pima Cty. Attorney’s 
Office, to authors (Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with authors).  
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developed trust among the victims, enabling them to 
distribute relief quickly.130 Additionally, all proceeds of the 
fund went directly to the victims and not non-profits, a move 
aimed at avoiding controversies experienced by prior VCFs.131 
Moreover, while the fund itself may not have provided as 
much dollar compensation for each victim as other funds, 
administrators designed the fund to maximize compensation 
by working alongside Arizona’s Victim Compensation 
Program and an Anti-Terrorism Relief Grant.132 Thus, in the 
presence of three compensation sources, victims had a 
greater chance of having their losses fully compensated. 
Altogether, the fund administrator felt the fund compensated 
nearly all of the victims’ financial losses.133 
Our survey responses revealed that many citizens 
understand that lawsuits may not be worthwhile in the 
absence of “deep pockets” who possess the financial 
wherewithal to provide compensation, and the Loughner case 
may provide an example where victims recognized that the 
likelihood of receiving compensation was slim. The most 
attractive target for a negligence suit would be Pima 
Community College, where Loughner was a student, because 
the college was well aware of his disturbing behavior prior to 
the shooting.134 However, the college took corrective measures 
by reporting the killer’s behavior to the police on several 
occasions and suspending him until he sought mental health 
treatment.135 In theory, the college could have gone further by 
seeking court ordered mental health treatment, which would 
  
 130. Telephone Interview with Kent Burbank, Dir. of Victim Servs., Pima Cty. 
Attorney’s Office (Sept. 23, 2013).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. See Pima Community College Was On Alert About Jared Loughner One 
Week Before Giffords Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/15/pima-community-college-jared-lough
ner_n_823838.html.  
 135. See Jacques Billeaud & Terry Tang, Jared Loughner at Pima Community 
College: Emails Document Unstable Personality, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 
2011, 7:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/20/jared-loughner-at-pi
ma-co_n_864548.html.  
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have made it illegal for Loughner to possess firearms,136 but 
a successful negligence suit under Arizona law on that basis 
would likely require a finding that the college owed a duty to 
the shooting victims to seek court-ordered medical treatment 
for Loughner.137 Courts may be reluctant to make such a 
ruling because this could pressure colleges into actions that 
might potentially violate students’ rights.138 
Another factor that may have acted to limit litigation in 
the Tucson case was the perceived legitimacy of the criminal 
justice process. Criminal prosecution proceeded relatively 
quickly, as Loughner pled guilty and was sentenced to life in 
prison within two years of the shooting.139 Overall, victims 
appeared to be satisfied with the outcome,140 as the court 
sentenced him according to the shared intent of most victims 
to avoid the death sentence.141 Some victims were able to use 
  
 136. Larry Abramson, The Tucson Shootings and Mental Health Procedures, 
NPR (Jan. 11, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/11/132840720/
Alleged-Shooters-Mental-Health-And-College-Career.  
 137. Under Arizona negligence law, a finding of a duty to protect from third 
persons is a difficult threshold to meet. See DOUGLAS A. BLAZE & JEFFERSON L. 
LANKFORD, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN ARIZONA § 2.05 (3d ed. 2003).  
 138. Pima Community College was concerned about violating Loughner’s rights 
when considering taking further actions. Robert Anglen & Dennis Wagner, 
College Unsure How to Handle Loughner’s Behavior, Emails Show, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (May 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/
2011/05/19/20110519loughner-emails-pima-community-college-brk19-ON.html.  
 139. The shooting occurred on January 8, 2011. Loughner was sentenced on 
November 8, 2012. See James Ball, Jared Lee Loughner Sentenced to Life in 
Prison, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/gabrielle-giffords-confronts-shooter-jared-lee-loughner-in-
court/2012/11/08/09968fe2-29c7-11e2-b4e0-346287b7e56c_story.html. 
 140. Hipolito Corella, Tucson Shooting Victims Face Loughner Before He Gets 
Lifetime in Prison, ARIZONA DAILY STAR (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://azstar
net.com/news/local/crime/tucson-shooting-victims-face-loughner-before-he-gets-
lifetime-in/article_e234dff4-29c5-11e2-8c1d-0019bb2963f4.html; Michel Marizco, 
Tucson Shooting Victims Satisfied with Loughner Plea Deal, FRONTERAS (Aug. 7, 
2012), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/tucson-shooting-victims-satisfied-
loughner-plea-deal; Tucson Gunman Faces Victims, Including Gabby Giffords, 
Before Receiving Life Sentence, FOX NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.
com/us/2012/11/08/tucson-gunman-faces-victims-including-gabby-giffords-during
-sentencing. 
 141. Giffords Husband to Loughner: ‘Gabby and I Are Done Thinking About 
You,’ OZARKSFIRST (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ozarksfirst.com/news/giffords-
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his sentencing hearing as a means to move forward as well. 
For instance, a victim addressing Loughner stated, “You 
pointed a weapon and shot me three times. . . . And now I 
walked out of this courtroom and into the rest of my life and 
I won’t think of you again.”142 Others were simply satisfied he 
was in a place where he could no longer cause harm to 
society.143 In sum, the effective prosecution and punishment 
of the shooter in the Tucson case may have limited victims’ 
need to seek retribution through the tort system. 
6. Aurora Victim Relief Fund 
The State of Colorado and the Community First 
Foundation established the Aurora Victim Relief Fund in 
response to the July 20, 2012, mass shooting at a movie 
theater in Aurora, Colorado, that left twelve dead and an 
additional fifty-eight injured.144 The fund received over $5 
million in donations, which were distributed via lump sum 
payments.145 The fund’s compensation plan provided families 
of the twelve deceased and five victims suffering from 
permanent brain damage or paralysis with $220,000 each, 
six victims who were hospitalized for more than twenty days 
with $160,000 each, thirteen victims who were hospitalized 
from one to seven days with $35,000 each, and two victims 
who were hospitalized from eight to nineteen days with 
$91,680 each.146 All victims were eligible for free counseling, 
  
husband-to-loughner-gabby-and-i-are-done-thinking-about-you; see Corella, 
supra note 140.  
 142. Jared Loughner Faces Tucson Rampage Victims, CBS (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:09 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57546836/jared-loughner-faces-tucs
on-rampage-victims. 
 143. See Corella, supra note 140. 
 144. See Ben Brumfield, Payments from Aurora Victim Relief Fund Finalized, 
CNN (Nov. 18, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/17/us/colorado-auro
ra-compensation/index.html. See generally Officials Release Complete List of 
Injured Victims in Aurora Massacre, FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.
foxnews.com/us/2013/01/10/officials-release-complete-list-injured-victims-in-
aurora-massacre. 
 145. Brumfield, supra note 144.  
 146. Id.  
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and victims did not have to waive their right to sue in order 
to access VCF funds.147 
While victims ultimately received larger payments on 
average from the Aurora Fund than for several other VCFs, 
concerns over adequacy of compensation still appeared to be 
a major factor driving post-event litigation. Initially, the fund 
planned to disburse its resources to local non-profits who 
would then provide services to the victims, similar to the 
Columbine Healing Fund.148 This outraged victims, who went 
public with their disapproval.149 Consequently, the fund 
reevaluated its disbursement plan and decided to make lump 
sum payments directly to victims.150 Nonetheless, by the time 
the fund announced a new and final payment plan, victims 
had already filed several lawsuits against the movie 
theater,151 possibly out of concern about the original fund 
disbursement plan. In total, at least twenty-two lawsuits 
were filed in connection with the shooting.152  
  
 147. Id.; Ken Feinberg Announces Payment Plan for Aurora Theater Shooting 
Victims, DENVER POST (Oct. 15, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/
breakingnews/ci_21776275/ken-feinberg-announces-payment-plan-aurora-
theater-shooting. 
 148. CITY OF AURORA, 7/20 RECOVERY ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHRONOLOGY 1 
(2012), https://www.auroragov.org/cs/groups/public/documents/document/012318
.pdf. 
 149. Oren Dorrell & Gary Strauss, Aurora Shooting Victims’ Families Upset 
Over Relief Fund, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://usatoday30.usa
today.com/news/nation/story/2012-08-28/aurora-victim-families-speak/
57377450/1; Families of Aurora Shooting Victims Angry About Relief Fund, NBC 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/48818346
#48818346.  
 150. See Brumfield, supra note 144. 
 151. The following lawsuits were filed between July 27, 2012, when the initial 
fund disbursement plan was announced, and October 15, 2012, when the new and 
final payment plan was announced: See Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3, Jackson v. 
Cinemark, USA, No. 1:12-CV-02704 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2012); Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3, 
Medek v. Century Theaters, No. 1:12-CV-02705 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2012); 
Complaint, Rosborough v. Cinemark, USA, No. 1:12-CV-02687 (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 
2012); Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, Nowlan v. Cinemark, USA, No.1:12-CV-02517 
(D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2012); Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, Traynom v. Cinemark, USA, No. 
1:12-CV-02514 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2012).  
 152. See Axelrod v. Cinemark Holdings, Inc., No. 12-cv-02514-RBJ-MEH 
(D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2014) (order denying summary judgment) (denying Cinemark’s 
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7. Sandy Hook Community Foundation Fund 
Following the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting 
on December 14, 2012, United Way of Western Connecticut, 
and Newtown Savings Bank created what was to become the 
Sandy Hook School Support Fund.153 The fund received 
$11,400,000 in donations and distributed it according to a 
70-30 plan, where victims received 70% of the donations and 
the remaining 30% went to the community.154 Of the 70% 
distributed to victims, families of the twenty-six deceased 
received $281,000, families of twelve children who witnessed 
the massacre received $20,000, and two injured staff 
members received $75,000.155 Where the remaining 30% is to 
be allocated depends on the long-term needs of the 
community.156 
Controversy has swirled around the 70-30 plan. Victims 
vented frustration over the plan at town hall meetings, 
demanding more transparency and more input into the 
fund’s administration.157 Some questioned why 30% of the 
Fund’s proceeds were reserved for the community.158 With all 
  
motion for summary judgment against collective plaintiffs in twenty consolidated 
cases); see also Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, No. 
2014CV031946 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2014); Complaint at ¶¶ 7-13, Blunk v. Fenton, 
No. 13-cv-00080 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2013). 
 153. See Newton-Sandy Hook Community Foundation, Inc. to Oversee Sandy 
Hook School Support Fund, UNITED WAY W. CONN., http://www.uwwesternct.org/
sandyhook (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 154. Id.; see also Tracy Connor & Tracy Jarrett, Newtown Residents Vent 
Frustration at Meeting on Sandy Hook Fund Distribution, NBC NEWS (July 11, 
2013, 11:08 PM), www.nbcnews.com/news/other/newtown-residents-vent-
frustration-meeting-sandy-hook-fund-distribution-F6C10604182.  
 155. Plan Endorsed for Sandy Hook Community Foundation Distributions, 
NEWTOWN BEE (July 17, 2013), http://www.newtownbee.com/news/2013/07/17/
plan-endorsed-sandy-hook-community-foundation-dist/150154. 
 156. See UNITED WAY W. CONN., supra note 153.  
 157. Connor & Jarrett, supra note 154. 
 158. Dave Altimari, Some Sandy Hook Victims’ Families Still Angry Over Fund, 
HARTFORD COURANT (July 6, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-07-06/
news/hc-sandyhook-families-unitedway-20130705_1_sandy-hook-victims-founda
tion-shooting-spree. 
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of the controversy, however, litigation following the shooting 
has been limited. 
Roughly two years elapsed from the date of the shooting 
before the first lawsuits. On December 15, 2014, victims 
decided to sue the manufacturer and sellers of the gun used 
in the shooting, a somewhat surprising strategy because 
federal law makes it very difficult to sue gun manufactures 
for their weapons used in illegal shootings.159 On December 
14, 2014, victims also sued Newtown and its Board of 
Education.160  
There are a several potential explanations for the 
lawsuits. First, compensation may be a factor given that 
victims were not pleased with the Fund’s 70-30 distribution. 
Second, victims may also desire to hold parties accountable 
whom they feel are culpable, but who fall outside of the scope 
of the criminal justice system. Because the shooter killed 
himself and his mother—who was his caretaker and the 
source of the weapon used—there has been no legal 
accountability for those most directly involved in the tragedy.  
8. One Fund Boston 
In the wake of the bombing attack on the Boston 
Marathon in 2013, various donors created the One Fund at 
the behest of the city’s mayor and Massachusetts governor.161 
In all, the One Fund collected an unprecedented $80 million 
in donations.162 Almost all of the fund went directly to the 
victims as lump sum payments.163 Like prior funds 
distributing payments, the One Fund used a formula based 
  
 159. Pat Eaton-Robb & Dave Collins, Families of Newtown Victims Sue Rifle 
Manufacturer, YAHOO NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/fam
ilies-newtown-victims-sue-gunmaker-seller-141435892.html.  
 160. Michele Richinick, Families Sue Newtown School Board, Town for 
Children’s Deaths, MSNBC (Jan. 13, 2015, 1:11 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/ms
nbc/families-sue-newtown-school-board-town-childrens-deaths. 
 161. About the One Fund, ONE FUND, https://secure.onefundboston.org/pages/
about (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 162. Id. 
 163. James Oliphant, How Much is a Life Worth?, NAT’L J. (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/74873/how-much-is-life-worth?mref=scroll.  
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on the extent of the injuries to determine payments. Families 
of the four deceased and two double amputees received 
$2,195,000 each.164 Fourteen victims who had one limb 
amputated received $1,195,000 each.165 Depending on the 
length of their stay in a hospital, 212 victims received 
anywhere from $8000 to $948,000.166 Both in absolute terms 
and relative to the number of victims, the One Fund 
represents the largest and most generous private VCF that 
has arisen following a mass attack to date. 
Thus far, there has been little to no litigation 
surrounding the Boston attack. Costs seem prohibitive, as 
there appear to be no suitable targets for a lawsuit—the 
suspect is likely judgment-proof and the Boston Athletic 
Association, which manages the marathon, has its liability 
capped.167 Government agencies, municipalities, and police 
departments are likely immune as well.168 The fact that one 
of the alleged perpetrators of the attack was killed, while the 
other was seriously injured in the ensuing manhunt169 and 
faces the death penalty,170 may diminish victims’ inclination 
to turn to the tort system for accountability and retribution. 
One issue cited in our survey that has begun to surface 
among Boston victims is concern about whether the One 
Fund compensation adequately covers future unforeseen 
losses associated with the event. For example, some victims 
  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Martha Bebinger, No Clear Targets for Civil Suits in Marathon Bombings, 
WBUR (May 10, 2013), http://www.wbur.org/2013/05/10/marathon-victims-law
suits; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (West 2015) (capping liability 
of charitable organizations at $20,000 where a tort is “committed in the course of 
any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of such 
corporation”). 
 168. Bebinger, supra note 167.  
 169. Was Tamerlan Tsarnaev Schizophrenic? Boston Bomber Told Friends and 
Family He ‘Had Two People Living in His Head’ Was the Victim of Mind Control, 
DAILYMAIL (Dec. 16, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-25
24891/Was-Boston-bomber-Tamerlan-Tsarnaev-schizophrenic.html. 
 170. Tara McKelvey, Boston in Shock Over Tsarnaev Death Penalty, BBC 
(May 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32762999. 
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who experienced symptoms of traumatic brain injury and 
post-traumatic stress disorder several months after the event 
have expressed concern that the One Fund calculations, 
which were based upon the initial injury assessment, may 
leave them undercompensated.171 Other amputees, who 
received over a million dollars each from the fund, questioned 
the adequacy of even that sum for their lifetime needs given 
the cost of prosthetics, which can be quite expensive.172 
Moreover, their employment prospects have diminished 
significantly.173 As of this writing, the statute of limitations 
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50 79 $8,500,000 $108,000 100% 2 
AUSA Fort 
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30 40 $11,600,000 $192,400 70% 25 
One Fund 
Boston 
270 232 $70,500,000 $262,724.14 86% 0 
Table 6: Summary of Recent VCFs Established Following Mass Injury Events 
Notes: 
1. Fund disbursement was not direct lump sum payments. Instead, funds reimbursed 
victims for their losses and supplemented other sources of support. 
2.   At least two of the lawsuits were class actions involving approximately 300 plaintiffs. 
3.   The sole lawsuit includes roughly 150 plaintiffs. 
4.  Some compensation was provided as a lump sum payment directly to victims. Most 
compensation received, however, reimbursed expenses. 
5. Nine families were represented in one lawsuit against manufacturers, and two in a 
lawsuit against the school board. 
 
Table 6 summarizes the funds reviewed above. As a 
whole, the pattern of victim behavior observed following real-
world events is in many ways consistent with the findings 
from our survey. The Fort Hood event, which has engendered 
no fund payouts thus far, and which has involved a lengthy 
and controversial criminal justice process, might seem 
particularly likely to foster follow-on litigation based on our 
survey responses indicating that compensation and 
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accountability are primary drivers of the decision to sue. 
There have indeed been substantial amounts of litigation 
since this event. Similarly, for both the Oklahoma City Fund 
and the Mile High Fund, available funds were much lower on 
a per-victim basis than for many of the later funds, and 
ultimately there was an appreciable amount of post-event 
litigation. For the Hokie Spirit Fund, the Sandy Hook Fund, 
and One Fund, in contrast, there was more money available 
on a per-victim basis and it was paid out quickly. Despite the 
fact that victims did not need to waive their right to sue to 
take money from these funds, post-event litigation has been 
scant. 
Perhaps the two funds that stand out as anomalies with 
respect to the compensation/litigation pattern are the Tucson 
fund—which had limited resources for compensation yet saw 
no litigation—and the Aurora fund, which provided fairly 
generous compensation on a per-person basis but still saw a 
fair bit of litigation. However, in these cases other factors 
cited in our survey seem to have been important moderators 
of victim behavior. In the Tucson case, the perpetrator was 
likely judgment-proof, which our survey suggests is a factor 
citizens recognize and take into account when formulating 
their decision to pursue a suit. The Tucson case also involved 
a very high-profile victim, which may have altered behavior. 
For Aurora, there was considerable initial uncertainty 
regarding how the VCF would be administered; many of the 
lawsuits there may have reflected victims’ efforts to manage 
the uncertain possibility that they might receive no 
compensation unless they filed a suit. Such uncertainty was 
also consistently noted in our survey as a reason for pursuing 
litigation. 
Real-world victims also cited some purposes for litigation 
that were not directly addressed by the survey. Families of a 
number of victims in Oklahoma City and Columbine 
expressed a desire to obtain answers about who precisely was 
accountable, a motivation similar to that expressed by some 
9/11 victims175 and some medical malpractice plaintiffs.176 
Such motivations may have emerged in the survey had the 
  
 175. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661-62. 
 176. Relis, supra note 36, at 365. 
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vignette included more ambiguity about the circumstances 
surrounding the injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis represents one of the first efforts to 
empirically demonstrate how VCFs affect victims’ 
willingness to pursue litigation. What implications do our 
results carry for policymakers, legal professionals, and the 
public? 
First, the tort system offers victims more than simply 
compensation, and because of this, it is probably unrealistic 
to expect VCFs to completely foreclose post-event litigation. 
The experimental survey results suggested that roughly half 
of adults would pursue litigation even when fully 
compensated for economic loss. It seems reasonable to expect 
that the actual number of suits among victims in a similar a 
real-life situation could be lower—and our analysis of real-
world funds suggests that this was indeed the case in some 
previous tragedies—because potential claims would be 
processed through the filter of the plaintiff’s bar. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be considerable appetite for 
litigation among even those who receive appreciable amounts 
of compensation.  
Our qualitative data explain this pattern by confirming 
findings in previous studies that potential plaintiffs consider 
the tort system to be a vehicle through which one can pursue 
multiple objectives, including compensation, vindication, 
policy change, retribution, access to information, 
acknowledgement of harms, accountability, and insurance 
against unforeseen future loss. While the insurance function 
might in theory be incorporated into a VCF, it seems unlikely 
that a VCF could ever serve many of these other functions of 
tort. Moreover, our research comports with previous findings 
that potential plaintiffs’ willingness to pursue or forego 
litigation can be heavily influenced not only by compensation, 
but also by these non-monetary litigation aims. 
Second, the data nonetheless clearly suggest that VCFs 
affect attitudes towards litigation, and that funds can reduce 
victims’ inclination to use the tort system. If policymakers’ 
objective following a mass disaster is to allow those who are 
injured to recover quickly without the need to resort to 
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potentially lengthy, costly, and uncertain litigation, then 
VCFs can provide an important tool to further that end. 
Third, if there is a fund, decisions about how to structure 
or administer it can influence future litigation. The survey 
and real-world data suggest that one of the most important 
fund characteristics, but which is typically outside of 
policymakers’ control, is the total amount of compensation 
available. However, for a given amount of resources, the data 
do suggest particular approaches that may have greater 
effects on tort litigation. Making small token payments to a 
large number of people—which is normal in more 
conventional consumer class actions—may not be an effective 
strategy; our experimental survey data revealed that 
litigation rates among those who received small payments 
relative to their loss were similar to those who received no 
payments at all. At the same time, VCFs do not necessarily 
need to fully compensate individuals for economic or other 
losses to affect litigation—victims are in many cases 
conscious of the substantial emotional and in some cases 
financial costs of pursuing litigation, and may be deterred 
when fund payments close the gap between their loss and net 
potential gains from litigation. 
Both the survey and the real-world examples further 
suggest that choices regarding the timing of the payments 
can affect willingness to sue. Delaying payments too long, 
which arguably occurred with the Oklahoma City Fund, the 
Fort Hood Fund, and the Aurora Fund, can encourage 
litigation. However, if payments are made too quickly, before 
the full extent of event-related injuries manifest, our survey 
responses indicate that some victims may resort to litigation 
to address concerns about potential unforeseen future harms. 
Taken together, the data suggest that funds may be most 
successful at supplanting litigation in situations where there 
are substantial amounts of money available in the fund, the 
extent of injuries for victims is clear, responsibility for the 
event is apparent, and the criminal justice process has high 
legitimacy. 
In instances of mass violence, VCFs often arise from 
spontaneous feelings of sympathy and generosity among the 
general public which leads them to make donations to assist 
victims. In these situations, the establishment of a VCF is 
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not necessarily the result of a specific policy decision. Our 
results thus do not directly address situations such as 9/11 or 
the Deepwater Horizon spill, where VCFs have been used as 
a way to discourage lawsuits against one or more deep-
pocketed defendants for whom legal liability for a particular 
set of harms was not fully certain. However, at the risk of 
over-generalizing, one might also wish to consider whether 
our results can provide any insights for potential defendants 
who might be considering operating funds in such 
circumstances. 
First, there appear to be some important differences 
across segments of the population in willingness to pursue 
litigation following an injury. Although the precise reasons 
for these differences remain obscure, this finding suggests a 
VCF’s effects on litigation may, in part, depend on the target 
population for the fund. Second, in our scenario, VCF 
compensation reduced willingness to pursue litigation even 
though VCF payments did not require a waiver of the right 
to sue. This pattern suggests that VCFs may benefit potential 
defendants even if payments are made without a waiver, 
because some who are able to sue may decide not to do so once 
they receive some amount of compensation.  
Third, there appears to be a small segment of the 
population who would not pursue a suit even without 
compensation. If this pattern extends to the situation where 
a corporate defendant establishes a VCF, then some of the 
deterrent benefits of setting up a fund would be offset 
because defendants would end up paying compensation to 
some victims who would not have been compensated through 
traditional tort mechanisms. Fourth, our data suggest that 
where multiple potential tortfeasors are involved, the 
presence or absence of a fund may not greatly impact victims’ 
allocation of blame across the different parties.  
Although this analysis provides an important first step 
in understanding how VCFs affect victim behavior, many 
questions remain. One fruitful area for future study would be 
to more carefully consider the breadth of situations across 
which VCFs might provide an alternative to litigation. For 
example, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility was established in 
part based upon the belief that providing rapid compensation 
to those affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill could 
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eliminate future litigation and associated costs while still 
providing injured parties a satisfactory resolution. It is 
unclear at present whether a VCF can provide a viable 
alternative to tort in such a situation. More generally, it 
seems possible that VCFs could reduce litigation in more 
traditional mass injury scenarios where corporations are 
defendants, causality is more difficult to establish, and the 
number of potential claimants is large. However, how much 
a fund could impact behavior in such a situation—and 
whether it could pass a cost-benefit test from the perspective 
of a defendant—remains an open question. A related 
question concerns whether the source of the money for a fund 
matters—in the scenario we presented, the VCF was funded 
through charitable donations, but in some cases, such as the 
9/11 Fund and the Tucson Together Fund, VCF funds came 
from governmental sources. It seems reasonable to imagine 
that whether fund monies come from taxpayer dollars might 
affect victim behavior, but at this point it is unclear whether 
and how such effects operate. 
Our analysis also does not address many important 
procedural justice aspects of VCFs. For example, there are 
many aspects of fund design, including how quickly 
payments are made, what injury documentation is required, 
whether hearings or other proceedings are held to allow 
victims to express feelings regarding the fund, and whether 
there is an appeals process, all of which likely affect whether 
victims believe they are treated fairly by a fund, and thus 
seem likely to ultimately affect their feelings about pursuing 
litigation. Additional research seeking to better understand 
the procedural justice aspects of VCFs is warranted.  
Although there remains much to learn about what VCFs 
can and cannot accomplish, what is apparent is that VCFs 
are likely to remain an important component of the public 
response to events of mass violence or injury. Policymakers 
and legal scholars need to incorporate such programs and 
their effects into how they think about compensation and 
remedies following such tragedies. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Text of Survey 
Imagine the following: During a large concert in a 
stadium, a gunman in attendance opens fire on the crowd, 
wounding and killing several dozen people before being 
captured. 
(Versions 3, 4, and, 5): After the shooting, a variety of 
charitable organizations, individual donors, and 
entertainment companies contribute money to a victims’ 
fund. The fund makes automatic payments to shooting 
victims and their families based upon the severity of their 
injuries. 
Those harmed by the attack and their families could file 
a lawsuit with the help of an attorney and seek injury 
compensation. Suppose you were advising a loved one or 
friend who had a total of $5,000 {$55,000} in wage and 
medical losses from injuries in the shooting, (Versions 3, 4, 
and 5): and who had received a $5,000 {$50,000} payment 
from the victims’ fund. 
 
Would you recommend they pursue a lawsuit? 
__ Yes __ No 
 
(If Yes) Who would you recommend they sue for their injuries 
(check all that apply): 
__ Gunman           __ Gun seller or manufacturer 
__ Owner of the stadium      __ Security Company 
__ Concert promoter or performers  __ Other  
 
 
Please explain your answer regarding pursuing a lawsuit: 
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Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Survey Version 
(reference: $5000 loss, no VCF) 
$55,000 loss, no VCF -.014 
(.110) 
$5000 loss, $5000 VCF payment .012 
(.129) 
$55,000 loss, $5000 VCF payment .075 
(.112) 












# in Household -.022 
(.027) 
Employment Status 








(reference: Less than HS) 
High School Only .302* 
(.156) 
Some College, No Bachelor’s .395** 
(.161) 
Bachelor’s Degree .424** 
(.175) 
Advanced Degree .616*** 
(.193) 





































Table A1: Regression Estimates Relating Demographics to  
Number of Parties Sued 
Note: The table reports coefficients from a linear regression model where the outcome is 
the number of parties sued (1–6) and the explanatory variables include demographic 
characteristics of the respondents. The sample is limited to those who indicate that they 
would sue. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
estimates that are statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence levels respectively. 
 
